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Introduction 
 
The prevention and control of fraud are two of the great challenges for Australia now, and 
in the years to come.  Success in dealing with fraud will enhance Australia’s business 
reputation, save resources in the public sector, and reduce the personal hardship that fraud 
causes to countless victims each year. 
 
Fraud involves the use of dishonest or deceitful conduct in order to obtain some unjust 
advantage over someone else 
 
The circumstances in which fraud can exist are enormously diverse.  Some of the types 
include: commercial fraud, fraud against governments, consumer fraud, migration fraud, 
securities fraud, superannuation fraud, intellectual property fraud, computer and 
telecommunications fraud, insurance fraud, plastic card fraud, charitable contribution 
fraud, identity-related fraud, advance fee fraud, art fraud, health care fraud, the list goes on 
and on, and new opportunities for deceptive conduct arise all the time.   
 
Fraud has been around for as long as people have been around  -  somebody trying to con 
somebody else, to offer them an unbelievable and unattainable deal, or to work the system 
unlawfully to their own advantage so that things come incredibly easily.  While crimes of 
deception are well-established in history,  technological, social, demographic and 
economic developments have brought about changes in the form fraud takes and how it is 
perpetrated.  Scams and cons have been around as long as commerce itself, but now, many 
are facilitated by digital technology. 
 
Fraud is not specifically defined by legislation in Australia, but everybody seem to know 
what it is (except some who commit it, and purport to have no idea that what they had 
done was wrong!).  It is, like an elephant, easier to recognise than it is to define! 
 
Both individuals and organisations may be the victims of fraud.  
 
In the federal criminal law system which operates in Australia, there are nine separate 
jurisdictions, each of which has its own common law and legislative offences involving 
fraud and deception.  These offences cover a wide range of conduct involving an element 
of deception and the definitions used have changed over time.  In Victoria, for example, 
police statistics record over 100 separate offences included in the category ‘deception’.  
These include various forms of obtaining property by deception, forgery, conspiracy, 
impersonation, secret commissions, and making false statements. 
 
Whichever way we look at it, fraud is a crime, and despite protestations of all sorts, 
nothing mitigates that.  
 
Every crime requires three ingredients: a motivated offender, a suitable target and an 
opportunity.  We have our work cut out for us in developing policies and practices to  
 
• Try to reduce the supply of motivated offenders 
• Protect and educate the suitable targets 
• Limit opportunities by making the crime more difficult to commit 
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In exploring these ideas we confront policy agendas of considerable complexity.  We also find 
ourselves confronted by boundaries, which on the surface can be easily mapped, but which, in 
reality sometimes appear convoluted and unconquerable.  When we add a dose of technology 
to the boundaries then we are confronted with complex jurisdictional and technical issues, 
especially if the victim and offender are in different places, and the money has moved at the 
speed of light through cyberspace. 
 
The key to attacking fraud is to work in partnerships to attain the objectives just listed. 
 
⇒ To deal with the first objective, reducing the supply of motivated offenders, is a hard one 
because there has always been greed, and the traditional crime prevention activities of 
early intervention are not applicable.  People commit fraud without many of the usual risk 
or predictive factors.  We are dealing here with culture and ethics  -  not something that 
comes in a five minute pep talk.  At the other end of the spectrum, but dealing with the 
same issue of reducing the supply of motivated offenders, judicial punishments also play a 
role.  Prison, which has few redeeming features, probably works better as a deterrent for 
fraud offenders than for many others.  Similarly, confiscating a fraudster’s home or car 
and requiring ill-gotten gains to be repaid over a lifetime are appropriate sanctions for 
white collar offenders. 
 
⇒ To deal with the second objective, protecting and educating the  targets of fraud is a 
crucial part of the prevention equation.  It involves a knowledgeable and informed public 
able to identify an offer which appears “too good to be true” as well as a mechanism for 
keeping new information flowing, at both an individual and organisational level.  This 
goes hand in hand with a fraud control policy. 
 
⇒ Limiting opportunities by making the crime more difficult to commit brings in the other 
side of the prevention equation, corporate governance and professional regulatory 
procedures. The technologies of crime prevention are also of fundamental importance 
here. 
 
These are some of the things I will deal with in this talk today. 
 
The Extent of Fraud in Australia 
 
It is confidently assumed that fraud costs the nation more than any other type of crime.  
The Australian Institute of Criminology estimated that fraud comprised about 16% of the 
total annual cost of crime , and in 1996 that was estimated to be between $3 and $3.5 
billion (based on a submission from the Australian Federal Police, to AUSTRAC).  
However, any dollar figure can only be a guess, although in individual cases losses are 
often calculated to the exact cent. 
 
There are a number of ways in which to estimate how much fraud takes place in Australia.  
Official statistics give an insight into crimes that come to the attention of the police, while 
business victimisation surveys provide information concerning those who have suffered at 
the hands of fraudsters.  Anecdotal historical accounts of high-profile crimes also 
document how fraud takes place and how much it costs the community.  Using each of 
these sources, fraud stands out as enormously costly, and a crime that has affected all 
sectors of society throughout history, even though dollar estimates are often no more than 
guesses,. 
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The financial journalist, Trevor Sykes, for example, has a lot of stories to tell.  In his book, 
Two Centuries of Panic (1988), he documents corporate collapses in Australian history 
since the turn of the nineteenth century until some of the building society and financial 
institution collapses of the 1970s.  In another book, The Bold Riders (1994), Sykes 
examines the corporate collapses of the 1980s concluding that these collapses and the 
associated fraudulent activities of some of the financial entrepreneurs were facilitated 
through unsound lending policies of the banks and the rise of fringe financial institutions. 
 
Official statistical information  shows that small scale fraud convictions increased 
substantially during the 1930s depression years but decreased during and after the Second 
World War when many young men were away.  Throughout the 1950s and 1960s there 
was a large increase, and in general, fraud boomed  between the late 1980s and 1991 
around and following the time of the economic boom and subsequent collapse of the share 
market on 20 October 1987.  (Institute of Chartered Accountants 1998).   
 
During the early 1990s, there was a decline, which may be due to the effects various fraud 
control initiatives taken by some public and private sector agencies such as the insurance 
industry.  Over the last few years, however, the rate has again begun to increase which 
may indicate a greater willingness to report fraud to the police, as already mentioned.  
These trends may also, of course, reflect changes in the underlying incidence of fraud in 
the community. 
 
In order to estimate the actual incidence of fraud committed, surveys of business 
victimisation are regularly conducted by some of the large international firms of 
accountants and consultants.  
KPMG’s latest Fraud Survey (1999) examined over 1,800 of Australia’s largest businesses 
in February 1999.  367 replies were received (20%) with information being provided on 
fraud awareness, the experience and cost of fraud, who perpetrated the fraud, how it was 
discovered, and why it occurred. Twelve per cent of respondents were unwilling to 
disclose the extent of their losses or were unable to quantify them.  Although two per cent 
of respondents reported having lost over $5 million in the two year period surveyed, most 
organisations reported losses of between $10,000 and $500,000 each. In the absence of 
more consistent and widespread policies on fraud reporting,  we are unlikely to know 




It is obvious that different types of fraud require different responses.  This paper will not 
describe the many types of fraud listed in the opening, and will confine responses to 
functional response  -  those that can be described as systemic or legal. 
 
SYSTEMIC RESPONSES TO FRAUD 
 
The key to fraud prevention on the part of organisations, whether of the public or the 
private sector, is the development and refinement, of an effective fraud control system.  
The foundation for such a system is a management philosophy which is sensitive to fraud 
risk.  The basic elements of such a system are careful recruitment of staff, a culture of 
integrity and loss prevention within the organisation, and regular auditing of transactions 
by internal controllers, backed up by independent and accountable external auditors.  The 
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first line of defence against complex corporate fraud is to ensure the greatest possible 
transparency of corporate transactions. 
 
Surveys have found that most frauds were perpetrated by employees of organisations 
rather than by outsiders.  In the 1999 KPMG survey it was found that only twenty-two per 
cent of fraud was carried out by parties external to the organisation.  The highest 
proportion of fraud carried out by outsiders related to theft of inventory and plant, forgery 
of cheques, and credit card fraud. 
 
This poses us with challenges for both reducing the supply of motivated offenders and 
making the frauds harder to commit.  Both can be achieved by looking at corporate 




It is now widely accepted that effective fraud prevention strategies must, in the first 
instance be generated from upper-level management.  If chief executive officers and 
managers at all levels have a commitment to fraud prevention and understand how it may 
be achieved, this will provide a foundation for other employees to support the notion of 
fraud control. 
 
Achieving this aim presents difficulties, however, in view of recent research which has 
demonstrated that most fraud is perpetrated by managers themselves who make purchases 
for personal use, misuse expense accounts or misappropriate funds (KPMG 1999).  Some 
of Australia’s largest corporate frauds have also been characterised by chief executive 
officers who exercise unfettered power, and boards of directors who are unwilling to 
challenge that power.  This makes the establishment of effective codes of practice and the 
creation of an ethical environment in the workplace difficult to achieve as such initiatives 
may challenge directly those in charge of the company who may, themselves, be the 
primary offenders. 
 
Another impediment to management taking a stance on fraud control is simple lack of 
understanding of how their organisations function in sufficient detail to be fully aware of 
the risks of fraud which exist.  In Ernst and Young’s survey of large organisations, for 
example, less than one third of the Australian respondents considered that their directors 
had a good overall understanding of their business for fraud prevention purposes (1998).  
 
Where it has been proved that company directors have acted dishonestly or in breach of 
the Corporations Law, it is essential that they not be permitted to repeat their illegal 
conduct at the same or at some other corporation.  Sub-section (3) of section 229 of the 
Corporations Law provides that persons convicted of certain offences are prohibited from 
managing a corporation, without the permission of a court, for a period of five years from 
the date of their conviction or, if imprisoned, from the date of their release. 
 
One practical strategy to enhance compliance with these rules is the initiative taken by the 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) which now maintains a public 
register of persons who have been disqualified from acting in the management of a 
company.  This information is readily accessible to the public through information brokers 
as well as the Internet (http://www.asic.gov.au/).   
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As we live in a global economy, international markets increasingly require conformity 
with global standards.  Today, best practice in corporate governance will require a degree 
of independence on a board of directors, and the existence of an audit committee 
comprised of board members.  Among the functions of such a committee are the selection 
of independent auditors for the company, and the review, in collaboration with the external 
auditors, planning and results of the audit engagement.  The committee also reviews the 
results of the audit, and recommendations made by the auditors, as well as the planning 
and results of the internal audits.  On top of this is the necessity of corporate disclosure, so 
that markets are kept fully informed of a company’s activities. 
 
Given the difficulties in prosecuting fraud, there has been increasing reliance in recent 
years placed on civil remedies as a complement or as an alternative to criminal 
prosecution.  In contrast to the criminal law, which requires proof beyond reasonable 
doubt of intent to defraud, civil remedies only require proof on the balance of 
probabilities.  Civil actions have prevailed not only against the perpetrators of fraud, but 
also against auditors who have been found negligent in the performance of the audit 
function.  The quantum of damages which might follow a successful civil action could be 
formidable, and act as a significant deterrent, at least where it is possible to gain access to 
seizable assets.  Civil remedies also provide for a degree of compensation to the victim 
which might not otherwise flow from the criminal process.  
 
Private Sector Initiatives 
 
Increasing recognition that the best line of defence against fraud is self-help has moved 
many private sector organisations to introduce and to improve fraud control systems.  To 
this end, they are aided significantly by the burgeoning industry of loss prevention 
services.  Failure to have effective fraud prevention and compliance systems in place may, 
in the future, result in corporations being subjected to civil and criminal penalties, not to 
mention bad publicity, poor profitability, and disruption to their operations. 
 
The need for businesses to develop and to implement effective fraud control policies has 
been affirmed with the publication of Australian Standard No. AS 3806-98 Compliance 
Programs, which provides guidelines for both private and public sector organisations on 
the establishment, implementation and management of effective compliance programs.   
 
One of the most comprehensive private sector fraud control policy documents is BHP's 
Guide to Business Conduct (1997).  This 54 page, clearly indexed booklet, which is 
available in various Asian languages, provides guidance for employees and managers in 
dealing with business conduct and in helping them to understand and to take responsibility 
for business conduct issues.  Issues canvassed include general principles for conducting 
business, ensuring compliance with legal requirements, how to identify and to avoid 
dishonest and unethical business practices and how to respond to conduct which appears to 
be in breach of the guidelines, such as through the use of the BHP Business Conduct 
Helpline.  
 
Many large accounting firms have established departments or subsidiaries specialising in 
fraud prevention.  Their products range from a total review of risk management practices 
to more narrowly focused issues such as security of information technology systems. 
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Private fraud control services are by no means limited to prevention.  Private organisations 
which find themselves the victims of fraud may retain their own in-house investigators, or 
may engage specialised fraud investigators residing in the private sector.  These private 
investigators may conduct an entire investigation, handing the matter over to the police for 




Public Sector Initiatives 
 
Public sector fraud takes many forms.  The vulnerabilities to fraud exist along three main 
dimensions:  
• individuals claiming benefits to which they are not entitled;  
• individuals evading payments due to government; and 
• individuals who contract with government to provide goods or services, failing to act 
as they have contracted to do. 
 
Because government agencies such as the Australian Tax Office or Centrelink deal in such 
large sums of money, the potential losses due to fraud are considerable.  The Australian 
National Audit Office’s (2000) recent survey of fraud control arrangements in public 
service agencies, for example, found that $145,862,000 was reported to be lost to fraud by 
106 agencies in 1998-99.  There is no doubt that Australian Governments have become 
increasingly sensitive to fraud risks.   
 
The design of systems can be an important means of fraud prevention.  The introduction of 
a requirement that the recipients of public funds have an account with a financial 
institution in which the funds can be deposited automatically, has dramatically reduced the 
risk of lost or stolen cheques, or fraudulent claims.  Automated payment also reduces 
clerical costs. 
 
An important strategy introduced in the early 1990s to control revenue fraud involved the 
establishment of an extensive database by the federal government which sought to reduce 
taxation and social security fraud, by identifying individuals who have made claims for 
benefits from government funds to which they are not entitled.  The Parallel Data-
Matching Program (PDMP) which was introduced in 1991 by the Data-Matching 
Program (Assistance and Tax) Act 1990 (Cth), makes use of tax file numbers and permits 
income records to be compared with payment records held by various benefit providing 
departments.   
 
The Fraud Control Policy of the Commonwealth outlines the principles of fraud control 
and develops national standards.  Although the policy relates only to Commonwealth 
government departments, and does not encompass any enforcement function, it provides a 
consistent set of policies and directions to assist departments in carrying out their 
responsibilities to combat fraud against their programs.  These include agency 
responsibilities for fraud prevention, reporting of fraud information, fraud investigation 
case handling and training of agency fraud investigators. 
 
Significant advances have also been made by various State and Territory government 
departments in developing fraud control policies.  The Australian Capital Territory 
Government Service Fraud Prevention Unit, for example, has established a fraud control 
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policy in accordance with the Public Sector Management Standards on Fraud Prevention.  
The policy sets out the responsibilities of managers and employees in relation to fraud 
control, describes the investigatory functions of the Fraud Prevention Unit and details the 
procedures for reporting fraud and corruption.  Section 9(t) of the Public Sector 
Management Act 1994 (ACT) requires public employees to report suspected fraud while 
the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1994 (ACT) provides protection against reprisals for 
those who report fraud and corruption in good faith (ACT Government 1994).  There are 
other examples in other jurisdictions. 
 
 
LEGAL RESPONSES TO FRAUD 
 
Dishonest and fraudulent behaviour is able to be dealt with using a variety of legal 
responses in addition to informal sanctions such as dismissing an employee who has 
defrauded a business, or what is known in the dispute resolution literature as ‘exiting’ a 
problematic situation (Hirschman 1970).  Often an organisation which has suffered loss 
through fraud may be unwilling to incur further time and expense in pursuing legal 
remedies, be they in the civil or criminal courts.   
 
Some may also view the benefits which may follow from reporting fraud to other 
regulatory agencies as plainly inadequate, and take no action at all.  By refraining from 
taking legal action, the potential benefits to an organisation, as well as to the wider 
community, in terms of individual and general deterrence will be lost, leaving the offender 
potentially free to repeat the dishonest conduct at the same or another place of 
employment, and providing no external sign to the rest of the community that fraudulent 
behaviour is unacceptable. 
 
Criminal fraud has traditionally been dealt with through the legal processes of 
investigation employing publicly-funded police services, prosecution by state-
administered prosecution agencies, trial in the criminal courts often employing juries, and 
punishment in the state-administered correctional system. 
 
In recent times, however, many of these functions have been taken over by privately-
funded agencies usually working in conjunction with their publicly-funded counterparts.  
Financial considerations have meant that only the most serious cases involving substantial 
monetary losses are likely to be fully investigated and tried, with the attendant possibility 
of convicted offenders receiving the most severe sanction of a term of imprisonment.  The 
legal response to fraud control has, therefore, been severely restricted, although the 




The first barrier to the criminal prosecution of an allegation of fraud lies in encouraging 
those who have suffered loss at the hands of offenders to report their complaint to the 
authorities.  Some, however, such as those who fall prey to bogus charitable solicitations, 
may never realise that they have been defrauded.  Where individuals are, in fact, aware 
that they have been defrauded, the law requires, in certain circumstances, that they bring 
this fact to the attention of the police.   
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Despite this requirement, there are powerful reasons why individuals may not wish to 
report offences of dishonesty to the authorities.  KPMG (1999), for example, found in its 
survey of businesses, that one third of organisations surveyed failed to report frauds to the 
police, many instead preferring to deal with the matter internally and or by dismissing the 
individual in question.  Ernst and Young’s study (1998) found that although nearly half of 
the organisations surveyed had a fraud reporting policy in place, fewer than half of those 
said that their staff were aware of the policy.  Other surveys have found that a belief that 
the matter was not serious enough to warrant police attention, a fear of consumer backlash, 
bad publicity, inadequate proof, and a reluctance to devote time and resources to 
prosecuting the matter.   
 
Various inducements may be needed to enhance the reporting of fraud.  These may include 
guarantees of anonymity where this is necessary to protect a business reputation, 
assistance in reducing the personal costs and time associated with the investigation and 
prosecution of a matter, perhaps by streamlining interviewing procedures and reducing the 
necessity for senior witnesses to be present in court for unnecessarily lengthy periods of 
time, and for documentary evidence to be used in preference to oral testimony wherever 
possible. 
 
The use of fraud reporting ‘hot lines’ may be another way of persuading employees to 
report fraud to management, although in Ernst and Young’s 1998 survey, more than fifty 
per cent of respondents were opposed to the idea with most opposition coming from 
company directors (1998, p. 11). 
 
 
Investigation and Policing 
 
In addition to the reluctance of individuals to report fraud, are many problems associated 
with the effective investigation of cases.  Offenders often go to considerable lengths to 
disguise their identity and to make documentary financial trails of evidence difficult to 
follow. 
 
Those who seek to mask their identity through the use of computer networks are often able 
to do so, by means of ‘looping’, or ‘weaving’ through multiple sites in a variety of nations.  
Electronic impersonation, colloquially termed ‘spoofing’, can be used in furtherance of a 
variety of criminal activities, including fraud.  Anonymous re-mailers and encryption 
devices can shield one from the scrutiny of all but the most determined and 
technologically sophisticated regulatory and enforcement agencies.  As a result, some 
crimes may not result in detection or loss until some time after the event, thus making the 
process of investigation even more challenging. 
 
Other issues which may complicate the investigation of computer-based frauds, entail the 
logistics of search and seizure during real time, the sheer volume of material within which 
incriminating evidence may be contained, and the encryption of information, which may 
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Public/Private Sector Partnerships 
 
Partnerships are required among both public sector and private sector agencies to assist in 
the process of fraud investigation.  In the future, the initial procedures associated with the 
collection and analysis of financial and business information in relation to cases of serious 
fraud will most likely be undertaken not by state-funded law enforcement bodies, but by 
individuals in the private sector and corporate entities themselves. 
 
Private sector professionals, such as solicitors and accountants who act for corporations, 
have a primary responsibility to their client and the information they collect and the advice 
they give is directed toward the needs of the client who is paying for their services.  Public 
sector law enforcement agencies, however, have primary responsibility to the community 
at large in detecting, investigating and prosecuting illegality.  A tension thus exists 
between investigations which may assist the corporation in its future business affairs and 
investigations undertaken primarily for use in legal proceedings.  A good example of this 
tension concerns the responsibilities of auditors in the examination of corporate financial 
statements. 
 
To be effective, public and private sector bodies which engage in the investigation of fraud 
will be required to liaise closely with law enforcement personnel and prosecutors in order 
to ensure that evidence is obtained in such a way as not to prejudice its use in criminal 
trials or otherwise to result in critical evidence being lost or damaged.  Such cooperation 
already occurs in many agencies, such as ASIC which works closely with private 
insolvency practitioners. 
 
Recently, initiatives have been taken to establish comprehensive training programs for 
those involved in the investigation of fraud.  Both the Victoria Police Major Fraud Group 
and the New South Wales Police Service’s Commercial Crime Agency have fraud 
investigators courses conducted by tertiary educational institutions which are now 
becoming open to non-police investigators.  This will help to ensure that all those involved 
in the investigation of fraud and forensic accounting, both from the public and private 





Having investigated a case of serious fraud, it then remains for the evidence to be 
presented to the relevant prosecution agency.  It is at this point that serious fraud cases 
often founder, as prosecutors may believe that the evidence presented to them is 
inadequate or that the chances of success are insufficient to justify the time and expense 
involved in a lengthy trial. 
 
The Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions maintains a dedicated group 
responsible for corporate prosecutions, and he will be speaking later today. 
 
In 1992 the High Court of Australia in the case of Dietrich v The Queen ((1993) 67 ALJR 
1) ruled that, unless exceptional circumstances exist, where a genuinely indigent accused 
person is unrepresented by counsel at a trial for a serious offence, the trial will be 
considered to be unfair and should be adjourned until legal representation is made 
available. 
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Few individuals are able to afford the costs associated with a long and complex criminal 
trial.  Defendants charged with serious fraud are often able to arrange their financial 
circumstances in such a way as to make them appear indigent and thus able to take 
advantage of the Dietrich ruling.  The effect may well be that a long and complex 




Because many fraud offences do not involve face-to-face interactions in their commission, 
it is possible for offenders and victims to be located in more than one jurisdiction.  More 
sophisticated conspiracies may involve individuals in three or more jurisdictions within 
Australia or overseas.  Few remedies are available to the unfortunate individual who might 
fall victim to such activities.  Even if one is able to mobilise the law, the chances of 
locating the fraudsters, obtaining extradition, mounting a prosecution, or recovering 
compensation may be impossible. 
 
Even where a perpetrator has been identified, two problems arise in relation to the 
prosecution of offences which have an international aspect: first, the determination of 
where the offence occurred in order to decide which law to apply; and, secondly, obtaining 
evidence and ensuring that the offender can be located and tried before a court.  Both these 
questions raise complex legal problems of jurisdiction and extradition (see, generally, 
Lanham 1997). 
 
In Australia, a package of measures was adopted in the later 1980s to facilitate the 
prosecution of organised crime and serious fraud. These included the Mutual Assistance in 
Criminal Matters Act 1987 (Cth) which established mechanisms to facilitate international 
cooperation between investigators with respect to obtaining evidence, the location of 
witnesses and suspects, the execution of search and seizure warrants, the service of 
documents, the forfeiture of property and recovery of fines and various other matters; the 
Proceeds of Crime Act 1987 (Cth) which enables investigators to follow the trail of the 
illegal proceeds of crime internationally and to confiscate assets; the Cash Transactions 
Reports Act 1988 (Cth) which established a government agency to monitor the movement 
of large-scale cash transactions; the Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) which extended Australia’s 
ability to enter into extradition arrangements internationally; and the Telecommunications 
(Interception) Amendment Act 1987 (Cth) which extended the ability of agencies to 
undertake electronic surveillance for law enforcement purposes.  The International Branch 





The challenge for law reform in relation to complex fraud trials lies in striking a balance 
between the efficiency of the judicial system and the rights of individual offenders and 
victims involved in the prosecution. 
 
The principal difficulties relate to the presentation of voluminous business and accounting 
records to a court, the difficulty of presenting complex financial transactions to a jury in 
such a way as to permit lay people, perhaps unfamiliar with business transactions, to 
understand the factual issues involved, and the length of time which such trials take, which 
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is often exacerbated in cases of criminal conspiracy by having multiple defendants and 
multiple charges (see, generally, Rozenes 1992). 
 
Various reforms to court procedures have been introduced throughout Australia in recent 
years to reduce the length, complexity and cost of prosecutions, particularly those which 
involve substantial sums of money or complex factual circumstances.  Computer 
technology, for example, has greatly facilitated the presentation and analysis of complex 
business dealings (see Livermore 1992).  In addition, legal practitioners are now closely 
regulated with respect to the length, manner and nature of material which they present to 





At present in Australia each jurisdiction has its own laws and rules which regulate 
business activity, and this is not the time to do a lecture on federalism.   
 
The problem of harmonising laws relating to fraud and the implementation of the Model 
Criminal Code in this area has been comprehensively addressed in the response of the 
Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Department to the proposed uniform legislation.  The 
benefits of reforming the law in this area were graphically described in the Report as 
including the elimination of over 250 unnecessary and convoluted Commonwealth 
offences and the repeal and replacement of 150 offences in New South Wales alone 




In Australia, the following judicial punishments are currently available in most 
jurisdictions:  
• fines;  
• restitution and compensation orders;  
• forfeiture and disqualification (confiscation);  
• unsupervised release (suspended, deferred, conditional sentences);  
• supervised release (probation, community service, intensive corrections) and  
• custodial orders (either full time or periodic). 
 
In addition there are other consequences of wrongdoing which may be invoked: adverse 
publicity; professional disciplinary sanctions; civil recovery action; injunctive orders and, 
most recently, various forms of reconciliation or community conferencing which are being 
evaluated at present. 
 
Little research has been carried out in Australia on the manner in which offenders 
convicted of serious fraud offences are dealt with following a criminal trial.  A few 
prominent individuals have received wide publicity following their conviction when they 
have been sentenced to terms of imprisonment, but there is little that is systematic. 
 
Proportionally few offenders are in Australian prisons serving sentences for offences 
involving fraud.  Of Australia's 20,000 prisoners 3.5% of males and 10.5% of females 
have fraud/ misappropriation as their most serious offence. 
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There is a long debate about whether prison is more of a deterrent for white collar 
criminals than it is for those involved in street crime and violence.  We would like to think 
that prospective offenders would more effectively be deterred through increased efforts at 
fraud prevention and enhanced rates of detection and reporting of offences.  Increased 
spending on law enforcement activities might first be directed at detecting crime quickly 
and with certainty, and publicising this fact.  In addition, increased spending on education, 
training in business ethics, and fraud prevention initiatives would produce benefits in 








• opportunity, and 
• the absence of capable guardianship 
 
The basic motivation for fraud is greed, an fairly robust and enduring human 
characteristic.  We are unlikely to eliminate greed in my lifetime.  This is not to disparage 
the  ethicists among us.  Theirs is a noble calling, and their efforts to improve humankind 
have met with some success.  But the real payoffs in fraud prevention and control lie 
elsewhere. 
 
Crime follows opportunity, and opportunities for fraud flow from economic growth.  The 
more commerce there is, the more opportunities there are to commit fraud.  We do not 
want to close down the stock market, or the health insurance system, or pull the plug on 
electronic commerce, just because they may be vulnerable to fraud. 
 
Rather, the challenge lies in designing systems which allow commerce to flourish while 
blocking opportunities for fraud.  This challenges us to extend our ingenuity to counter 
that of villains, and to build smart systems. 
 
And of course, capable guardianship implies surveillance of transactions to enhance the 
risk that fraud will be detected.  This is the basis for auditing, which thanks to technology, 
can now occur in real time.  It also implies the simple raising of awareness to enable 
ordinary Australians to identify offers that are too good to be true.  This involves a 
partnership process in which we all can be capable guardians in the prevention of fraud.   
 
The challenge for the years to come lies in understanding how new forms of fraud are 
perpetrated, and in ensuring that those charged with preventing and dealing with fraud 
have the intellectual and operational resources with which to do their work.   
 
Reducing the risk of fraud without detracting from prosperity is the challenge which we 




Most fraud in the twenty-first century is sophisticated in planning and execution.  It 
utilises computing and communications technologies and crosses jurisdictional boundaries 
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with ease.  The solutions, therefore, must acknowledge these characteristics.  Fraud 
control needs to be sophisticated and needs to be carried out nationally and globally.  
Already we have seen considerable achievements in both these aspects.  Policing already 
makes use of the most recent forensic computing techniques and cooperative partnerships 
are widely established within Australia and overseas. 
 
Fraud prevention also needs to be sophisticated, although, as a recent British Home Office 
publication notes, it’s ‘Not Rocket Science’!  Some aspects of fraud prevention may 
involve individuals in the community taking basic measures to protect themselves, such as 
by using the security measures that modern computing technologies have to offer in a 
sensible and thoughtful way—and not simply writing one’s password on one’s deskpad!  
Other target hardening measures may require elaborate and complex planning in order to 
thwart the efforts of fraudsters fully trained in the operation and management of electronic 
business systems. 
 
Because it is usually those within organisations who perpetrate fraud internally, efficient 
measures need to be adopted to scrutinise staff when they are first appointed and to 
monitor their trustworthiness throughout the length of their employment.  There are now 
sophisticated electronic technologies available that may be used to monitor the activities 
of staff and to ensure that they do not succumb to the temptations and opportunities for 
fraud which middle and upper management have to offer.  Maintaining surveillance of 
staff must, of course, respect individual privacy and comply with laws that regulate 
surveillance, electronic monitoring, and the maintenance of databases containing personal 
information. 
 
Managers also need to take personal responsibility for dealing with fraud and for reporting 
it to the authorities.  This will not only help to inculcate an environment of honesty and 
openness within an organisation, but will enhance deterrent effects for other staff and 
enable the public generally to understand new areas of risk and security weaknesses.  
Sweeping fraud under the carpet by dismissing untrustworthy employees, compounds the 
problem and creates an atmosphere of complacency within organisations.  At every 
available opportunity, a culture of compliance needs to be reinforced. 
 
In the end, fraud prevention and control require the concerted efforts of individuals 
working both within the public and private sectors who make use of the most up-to-date 
and effective fraud control technologies.  When all else fails, an efficient legal system 
must also exist to detect, investigate, adjudicate, and sanction those who seek to obtain 
funds dishonestly.  There has been considerable progress in each of these aspects already 
and Australia is at the forefront of many innovative developments in fraud control. 
 
The challenge for the years to come lies in understanding how new forms of fraud are 
perpetrated and ensuring that those charged with preventing and dealing with fraud have 
adequate resources to do their work.  As in most areas of crime control, it is better to 
allocate resources in preventing crime than in seeking to deal with the consequences after 
the problem has arisen. 
 
 
 
